ABSTRACT. We analyze a reform of insurance companies
The recent financial crisis has triggered a broad push toward increased regulation of the financial sector, and a vigorous debate about how to best implement this overhaul. At the heart of the debate is the issue of capital requirements. In particular, Admati et al. (2013) and Thakor (2014) argue that financial institutions should be subject to significantly higher capital requirements in order to mitigate risk-shifting incentives and increase the stability of the financial sector. On the other hand, Ordonez (2013) and Plantin (2014) argue that increased regulation of banks may push intermediation into unregulated entities (e.g., the "shadow banking" system). However, understanding what capital requirements ought to be is not sufficient for understanding policy and giving advice. Reforms may reflect other forces than the long run "first best," such as industry pressure (Stigler, 1971) , conflicts of interest (Zingales, 2013) , distorted incentives for regulators (Leaver, 2009) or capacity constraints on regulatory activity. Which of these forces have influenced recent regulation is not well understood. The ELOSS measure is highly correlated with market prices (-0.85 for ELOSS produced by 
One way to learn about forces that influence contemporary rulemaking is to examine particular regulatory episodes. The recent financial crisis prompted large reform pushes across all advanced economies and touching most parts of the financial system. This has generated a large set of events to study, including the one we in analyze in this paper: a reform of the capital requirements for U.S. insurers in 2009 and 2010. This event is particularly interesting, for two reasons. First, it constituted an abrupt and distinct change in capital requirements, which is a key policy choice. Second, the reform was deep enough to be important to the industry, impacting all insurance holdings of mortgage-backed securities, but narrow enough that we can use other, unaffected, asset classes as a benchmark. The design of the reform allows fairly clean identification of how the industry's risk-taking responded to its changed regulatory incentives. In brief, capital requirements were lowered, especially for risky MBS. Insurers appear to have responded by assuming substantially more risk in new acquisitions of MBS (but not in other asset classes). Apart from delineating the response to a broad change in capital requirements

for BlackRock). In cross-sectional regressions predicting default, ELOSS contains some information that is neither contained in credit ratings nor in market prices. However, ELOSS does not outperform credit ratings outperform in predicting future defaults. Thus, our analysis rejects the idea that the new system uses more accurate inputs to regulation by replacing ratings. We also test whether Pimco and BlackRock exploit their new quasi-regulatory powers for their own trading purposes. We cannot find any evidence of this.
What about the new system for calculating capital requirements for MBS holdings? To evaluate the new system, we can rely on NAIC's stated rationale for capital requirements: "Risk based capital requirements limit the amount of risk a company can take. It requires a company with a higher amount of risk to hold a higher amount of capital. Capital provides a cushion to a company against insolvency."
With regards to this stated objective, our results are unambiguous: Compared to the previous system, not only does the new system require much lower levels of capital, but across firms and assets, capital has also become less related to the economic risk of asset positions. The mechanics of the new system can be illustrated with the following stylized example, assuming risk-neutrality and zero discounting for simplicity: consider an asset with $100 par value and a 5% probability of paying off nothing, worth $95 or a $5 expected loss. Under the current system, this asset would be assigned a $5 capital requirement if held at par ($100), but (virtually) no capital requirement if held at $95 (since book value equals asset value). The implicit hypothesis of the regulator is to treat the asset as if it had a certain $95 payoff, and the new system requires no buffer against a payoff below that expected value. However, the asset is risky even if held at $95 (with 5% probability its return is -100%), and if capital requirements should track risk, the asset deserves a non-zero capital requirement.
As is clear from this simplified description of the new system, it essentially only accounts for expected losses, i.e., losses that are already reflected in the market price but not yet recognized in the books of an insurer. Such a system only provides sufficient capital under the assumption that insurers hold a large number of independent asset risks, so that the aggregate portfolio is risk-free. While the law of large numbers is the foundation of insurance companies' liability side,
it does not apply to asset markets, in particular structured securities, which are heavily exposed to aggregate shocks (see Coval et al., 2009) . Thus, instead of requiring more capital for highsystematic risk assets, as Iannotta and Pennachi (2012) (Olson 1965 , Stigler 1971 , Peltzman 1976 . This fits prior experience: Krozsner and Strahan (1999) Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2014) Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) (Koijen and Yogo, 2012 , provide evidence on underpricing of life annuities) or portfolio decisions (Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundblad 2011, and Ellul et al., 2013) when subjected to financial stress. Finally, the issue of design of new rules is also related to their enforcement, studied in the bank context by Agarwal, Lucca, Seru and Trebbi (2012 13 The term R 0 is outside of the square root to prohibit regulatory arbitrage via the legal structure of companies. Koijen and Yogo (2013) Campbell et al., 2001 Table 1 ). The new system only applies to structured securities which are, by design, heavily exposed to systematic risk (Coval et al., 2009) 
Selective trading behavior within MBS is driven by two channels: 1) gains trading and 2) risk-based capital requirements. The gains trading channel predicts that insurers prefer to sell MBS assets with high market prices (relative to their book value) whereas the channel of risk based capital requirements (under the new system) suggests that insurers favor not selling assets with a high intrinsic value (relative to the book value). Thus, while the prediction with respect to an insurer's book value is theoretically ambiguous due to the conflicting channels of gains trading and capital requirements, the channels jointly imply higher selling incentives for securities with high market prices relative to their intrinsic value. Exploiting cross-sectional variation in the difference between the market price of the security and Pimco's / BlackRock's estimate of the intrinsic value we find strong evidence that insurers accumulate assets with low market prices and high intrinsic values in the RMBS market. In other words, within the MBS asset class, the new rules favored a risky portfolio composition with high-yield assets.
The effect on secondary markets is dwarfed, however, by the impact of the new system on insurers' purchases of newly issued securities. The new rules generated a substantial shift in how insurers invest in newly issued CMBS (non-agency RMBS issuance remains very low after the crisis). In the two years leading up to the new rules, purchases of newly issued CMBS by insurance companies were 92.5% investment grade (value weighted), but in the two
Now using the definition of IV = 1 ELOSS − we obtain the following decomposition of IV ( ) Coval et al., 2009) , are still subject to the relatively more stringent ratings-based capital regulation. If insurers want to reach for yield (Becker and Ivashina, 2012) Griffin, Nickerson, and Tang (2013) Figure 3) rather than CMBS. Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad 2012 , Koijen and Yogo, 2012 , and Becker and Ivashina, 2012 Figure 1 ). Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Donald and Lang (2007) . 34 Table 2 and Figure 3 ).
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Portfolio Allocations and Capital Requirements
In column (1) of Table 4, we report a regression for RMBS, with no controls. To simplify the analysis, we first focus on the difference between market price and intrinsic value (MP-IV). We report the mean of the dependent variable at the top of each column. In column (1), the mean is -0.21, meaning that on average, there is a reduction in insurers' RMBS holdings in 2010. The coefficient on MP-IV in column (1) is large, negative and highly statistically significant. 34 A 10% differential between market price and intrinsic value is associated with 2.3% drop in industry 32 We use par values, and not book values, to make sure only actual trading affects our results. Changes in book values reflect trading, but may also vary due to accounting adjustments. For the same reasons, we exclude defaulted and matured assets (this restriction does not in practice impact our results qualitatively). 33 The problem of exaggerating statistical power when unit of observation is more smaller than the level of variation of the variable of interest is discussed in the context of difference-in-difference estimates in
Capital requirements are lower for property and casualty insurers, and the accounting rules differ. We have separated holdings into life insurance and non-life (i.e. health and other as well as property and casualty). The results in
Next, we introduce controls for security characteristics, including seniority, vintage, and credit rating, in order to make sure that the effect we observe is not driven by some omitted variable which insurers might base their trading behavior on. Several of the control variables enter significantly (for example, insurers tend to sell more of larger issues, perhaps reflecting liquidity). The slope on MP-IV is negative and significant again. The slope is similar to the regression with no controls, suggesting that while other factors are related to insurers' trading, they do not drive our results. In column (5), we estimate the slope separately for price and intrinsic value. Both appear with the expected sign. Notably, the coefficient on intrinsic value is highly significant, indicating again that trading behavior reflects capital requirements.
We next turn to the introduction of the new system for CMBS at year end 2010. Given the significant trading responses to RMBS, we might expect similar behavior for CMBS after new capital requirements were implemented for these assets. In column (7), there is indeed a negative coefficient on the key variable but when we include more control variables, in column (7), we find that there is no response to MP-IV for CMBS in the year. The absence of the predicted trading pattern may reflect the fact that regulatory constraints for CMBS are low to begin with (see
In conclusion, Table 4 shows that the portfolio impact of the new RMBS capital rules was substantial, and in the direction of assets with low values and low capital requirements. Any risky asset misclassified by the system as safe will be particularly attractive, and indeed, such assets seem to have become favored by the insurance industry after the new rules.
The results in Table 4 Figure 5) , we note that they are still small relative to overall insurer portfolios (cf. 
Our identification relies on the fact that the new rules constituted an especially large reduction in the capital requirements for riskier assets. We first use investment-grade status as a proxy for the riskiness of an asset. Overall, 92% of insurers' asset purchases during the 2008-2011 period were investment grade. Figure 5 shows the share of aggregate insurance industry purchases of newly issued securities which were rated investment grade broken down by year and asset category. While many non-investment grade corporate and municipal bonds have been issued during this time period, insurers avoid them, both before and after 2011. Insurers' assets purchases of Other Asset Backed securities are also overwhelmingly investment grade (this category includes securitized products backed by credit card debt, auto loans, etc.). For all these categories, there is no discerning time trend in the riskiness of asset purchases. The final category, MBS, consists almost exclusively of CMBS in this period of very low private label RMBS issuance (agency RMBS is not included
Overall, the results on insurers' aggregate investment behavior in the market for new high yield securities point to a large increase in risk appetite isolated to MBS securities. Thus, aside from the direct effect the new capital requirement rules had on the amount of equity insurers have to hold, they also have an important impact on the industry's portfolio decisions. The effect is stronger for RMBS in secondary markets, but also very prominent in new issues markets which currently only have CMBS. Thus, both types of MBS are affected by the new rules. While the risk-taking effect in both markets is large relative to purchases (cf.
Analysis of new Input: ELOSS
While our previous analysis highlighted the implications of the new system for risk buffers and risk-taking incentives, we now turn to the narrower question whether ELOSS is a superior measure of credit risk. To this end, we test the informativeness of ELOSS in predicting defaults
Finally, since it is empirically true that (almost all) bonds have a coupon rate c that is greater than the risk-free rate, we obtain that: 
